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I. Sub-Saharan Africa
During the year, a variety of local, sub-regional, continental and global events gave off dif-
ferent signais. At times, there were indications of measurable achievements in terms of
advancing African interests, but there were, in contrast, also setbacks. Inadequate perfor-
mance continued to be the hallmark of many African économies, while conflicts still raged
in many sub-regions, notably Central and West Africa and Sudan's western province of
Darfur. Sub-Saharan Africa remained overall the least developed and most impoverished




The African Union (AU) continued to expand its institutional architecture, despite unre-
solved budgetary issues. This also cast a shadow over the growing peacekeeping rôle
ascribed to the organisation and so desired by Western donors, the AU Commission and sev-
eral of its member states. Thus, some bold décisions were taken to create new institutions
or organs or to launch new policy initiatives. In some cases, thèse décisions were actually
implemented, but without addressing thé underlying fmancial implications. Thèse were, fur-
thermore, complicated by thé perennial arrears in contributions from member states and thé
frequent failure of Western donors to make good on past financial pledges.
On 18 March, thé Pan-African Parliament was formally inaugurated in thé Ethiopian
capital of Addis Âbaba. This fulfilled a promise made back in the early 1990s and, for the
first time, provided the continental organisation, with a permanent forum for voices outside
thé strictly (inter-)governmental sphère. In July, heads of state decided to establish thé par-
liament's permanent headquarters in Cape Town, South Africa. With five MPs delegated by
each national parliament, thé 265-strong parliament was given only deliberative and con-
sultative powers for the time being. It was, nevertheless, hoped that thé parliament, chaired
by Gertrude Mongella of Tanzania, would make thé AU's govemment-dominated execu-
tive organs more accountable.
It was reported that thé parliament's existence would add another $ 30 m to thé AU's bud-
get. This came on top of thé priée tags for other new institutions not yet up and running, such
as the court of justice ($ 3 m) and thé économie, social and cultural council ($ 9 m). While
only $ 13 m of thé 2004 budget had been received by the time of the summit of heads of
state in Addis Ababa (6-8 July), with several countries facing the theoretical possibility of
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sanctions (i.e., loss of voting rights), the chairman pjjthe commission,̂
Konaré, nevertheless launched one of the most ambitions programmes for ta« conti-
nental organisation ever. This plan, intended to propel Âfrica i|̂ h.e21stceatBîy, would
cost some $ 1.7 bn to accomplish and involve a doubling of thé l̂lanisatioa's headquar-
ters staff, raising thé commission's operating costs to approximative 130 m ayear, Konaré
pleaded for an annual budget of $ 600 m, much of which would gpjo financé thé AU's pro-
jected collective security arrangement (see below). He suggested that mèmber states
reserve 0.5% of their national budgets to fund AU activities. ïnsîLstyle cnaracteristic of
African continental politics, the heads of state endorsed Konaré's plan but refused to com-
mit themselves to its financial implications, referring thé matteràglthe executive council,
which later approved a fourfold budget increase for 2005 froa*$JÉ3 m tp $ $5% m, While
this did not remotely approach Konaré's requested S 600 m, ittwaj|lecided that $ 63 m of
thé budget would hâve to corne from obligatory contributions b'y member states, thé other
$ 95 m to be requested from wealthy members such as Libya or Wél
m of the 2005 budget projected for peace and security issues alone^taFAlïin ëBtect con-
fronted Western donors in particular with thé financial implications of
slogan, 'African solutions to African problems'.
The ÀU's officiai policies on defence and security appeared to take §et
when its Peace and Security Council (PSC), whose protocol came'intp force on 26
December 2003, was solemnly launched at a meeting in Addis Ababa on 25 May ('Africa
Day'). Earher in thé year, on 20-21 January, Afncan defence ministers adopted a plan for
a common defence and security pohcy that would include an African peacekeeping force
of 10,000 to 15,000 troops. This African Standby Force (ÂSF) was endorsed by thé heads
of state at a spécial meeting in thé Libyan town of Sirte (27-28 February) and would com-
prise troops from several countnes, including South Africa, Nigeria, Egypt and Kenya
Uganda also offered troops through an East African arrangement that would become part
of the ASF, which would comprise four sub-regional brigades of 4,020 soldiers each. The
standby force was to operate under thé PSC, which, contrary to mauy reports, only bas a
mandate in 'peace support' opérations (which presumably require thé consent of the mem-
ber state concerned). Décisions about more forceful military actions in cases of war
crimes, crimes against humamty or génocide are reserved for thé AU's Assembly,
The projected peacekeeping rôle was first put to thé test with thé unfoldmg disaster m
Darfur. While thé UN Security Council did not getbeyond issuing verbal threats against
thé Sudanese government, the AU Assembly decided at its July meeting to send an armed
protection force of 300 men to the troubled Sudanese région (African Union Mission m
Sudan, AMIS). Its initial rôle would be to protect thé 60 AU officiais momtonng a ceasefire
hammered out between thé Sudanese government and two rebel movements rather than to
shield thé civilian population from attacks by armed groups. The size of the force was
clearly insufficient to help restore stability to the huge Darfur région, and it took several
months before thé troops, from Rwanda and Nigeria, arrived on thé scène. On 20 October,
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the PSC decided to enhance the force's mandate to include the protection of the civilian
population. The force was expanded but by the end of the year still stood at less than a quar-
ter of the projected total (3,000 to 4,000). While the Darfur opération was estimated to cost
some $ 26 m, only $ l .6 m had been paid into the AU's peace fund by July.
The deployment of troops was part of a wider AU concern with the crisis in Sudan, a con-
cern that was given concrete expression in a ceasefire agreement brokered and signed at AU
headquarters herween the Sudanese government and the two rebel movements on 28 May.
This was a follow-up to the ceasefire agreed between the Sudanese forces in N'Djaména
on 8 April. The PSC concemed itself with this matter at several of its meetings, while
Nigérian Président Obasanjo, elected chairman of thé AU's Assembly at its summit in July,
convened talks between thé belligerent forces in Abuja on 23 August, m thé présence of
Commission Chairman Konaré. Thèse talks went on intermittently for the rest of the year,
without a fundamental breakthrough being achieved regarding security on thé ground.
Thus, in thé course of new talks held in Abuja from 10 to 21 December, Konaré expressed
concern about thé détérioration of security as a resuit of numerous ceasefire violations.
Other issues on thé AU agenda concemed the continuing crisis in eastern DR Congo,
Côte d'Ivoire, Burundi, Somalia and Zimbabwe, among others. Some of thèse problems
were tackled more directly by other organisations or countries, such as thé UN, ECOWAS
and France. Président Mbeki of South Africa, as AU représentative, mediated in thé
Ivorian conflict with limited success.
The AU's summit in July also discussed thé rights of women, pleading for a strategy to
improve thé situation of women, as well as AIDS-related issues and thé social dimension
of globalisation, among other subjects. The continent's aspiration for its own seat in thé UN
Security Council bas so far proved divisive, with diplomatie wrangling between some of
thé AU's leading countries (South Africa, Nigeria, Egypt) as to who would be entitled to
thé seat in thé event that such permanent African représentation was achieved.
The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD)
During thé year, NEPAD implemented the first steps of the African Peer Review
Mechanism (APRM), which is considered an essential innovation and important tool for
achieving more collective responsibility among African states. On 13 February, Rwanda's
Président Kagame hosted in Kigali thé first summit of thé committee of participating heads
of state and government in thé African Peer Review Mechanism (APR Forum). The heads
of state from the Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Mozambique, Nigeria,
Rwanda, Senegal and South Africa attended this inaugural meeting. Président Kagame
expressed the view that thé APRM would offer assistance in tackling thé challenges of gov-
ernance. Nigeria's Président Obasanjo, as chairperson of the Heads of State and
Government Implementation Committee (HSGIC) of NEPAD, was unanimously elected
chairperson of thé APR Forum. The forum endorsed thé appointaient of Marie-Angélique
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Savané of Senegal as the chairperson of the APR Panel of Eminent Persons for a one-year-
period. The panel has a further six members from Algeria (for North Africa), Cameroon (for
Central Africa), Kenya (for East Africa), Mozambique (for Southern Africa), Nigeria (for
West Africa) and South Africa (also for Southern Africa), It is tasked with facilitating the
implementation of the APRM and ensuring the integrity of the process. With two repré-
sentatives each from West and Southern Africa, the panel reflects in its composition the
leading rôle played by the présidents of Nigeria, Senegal and South Africa in the estab-
lishment of NEPAD. The APRM is defined as "an instrument voluntarily acceded to by
Member States of the African Union as an African self-monitoring mechanism." To facü-
itate the process, the APR Panel submitted a questionnaire for a country self-assessment for
the APRM. lts four major sections correspond to the four areas identified as relevant to the
APRM: 1) democracy and good political governance; 2) economie governance and man-
agement; 3) corporate governance; and 4) socioeconomic development. The APR Forum
had - in line with the claim to African ownership of the process - at its inaugural meeting
in Kigali approved a minimum contribution of $ 100,000 by each participating country
towards the operationalisation of the APRM.
In a présentation to a NEPAD stakeholder dialogue in Johannesburg (22-23 October) on
the occasion of the initiative's third anniversary, the NEPAD Executive Secretary Wiseman
Nkuhlu (previously economie advisor to South Africa's President Thabo Mbeki) pomted
out that 24 African countries (including North Africa) already had signed the APRM
Memorandum of Understandmg and thereby volunteered to be reviewed by their peers.
During the year, the APRM was initiated with Ghana, Rwanda, Mauritius and Kenya. The
first APRM support missions took place on 24 to 29 May (Ghana), in June (Rwanda and
Mauritius), and on 26 and 27 July (Kenya). The second group to be reviewed in the near
future consists of six countries, Algeria, Mali, Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal and South
Africa.
At the third ordinary session of the AU Assembly of heads of state and govemment m
Addis Ababa (6 to 8 July), the chairperson of the 15-member HSIGC, Obasanjo, warned
that "unfulfilled commitments" by rieh nations could pose one of the greatest threats to the
envisaged development of Africa through NEPAD. He called on wealthy countries to move
beyond rhetoric and start taking action and warned of the "crippling capacity gaps" ham-
pering NEPAD's planning and the implementation of its development programmes at all
levels. A progress report indicated a new emphasis on the Regional Economie Communities
(RECs) as a strategie shift towards closer collaboration with existing sub-regional bodies.
Progress was noted in the implementation of sectoral priorities with sub-regional per-
spectives. Most prominent among these are the Comprehensive African Agriculture
Development Programme (CAADP) and the Short Term Action Plan (STAP) for infra-
structure, including télécommunications, transport routes, power supply schemes and
shared river basais. Both initiatives managed to secure considérable external financing. The
FAO funds medium-term Investment programmes to fast-track thé implementation of
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CAADP, while the World Bank provided $ 500 m to the Multi-country Agricultural
Productivity Programme (MÂPP). The ADB approved financing for nine investment pro-
jects under STAP, amounting to $ 580 m, and the World Bank approved financing for STAP
projects to a total of $ 570 m. However, as was noted in the communiqué issued at the end
of the l Oth summit of the HSGIC in Maputo (23 May), the total budget required from exter-
nal resources to fund all NEPAD infrastructure projects would amount to $ 8.1 bn.
Support by the United Nations was reiterated in a report by the Secretary-General sub-
mitted to the 59th session of the UN General Assembly on 4 August (A/59/206). A
13-member advisory panel monitors international support to NEPAD through the UN sys-
tem, including technical assistance for institutional development, capacity building, pro-
ject development, resource mobilisation and advocacy. The UN Economie Commission for
Africa (EGA) provides leadership for the regional consultation meetings of UN agencies
with the aim of establishing thematic clusters for NEPAD priority areas. The report rec-
ommended more efforts towards cohérence in thé international community's support for
Africa's development agenda, as well as an increase in donor funding. It stressed thé need
for a strengthened partnership in which African countries deepen their commitment to thé
priorities of NEPAD.
This could be read as a diplomatically phrased réservation, shared by critical observers
both on thé continent and outside, that NEPAD might not meet the original expectations had
of it. NEPAD organs continued to abstain from critical comment or other forms of inter-
férence with regard to Zimbabwe. The deteriorating situation there was considered to be
a litmus test for thé notions of good governance stressed by NEPAD, combined with thé
emphasis on collective responsibility versus national sovereignty. Owing to thé avoidance
of a critical stand with regard to the Zimbabwean crisis, however, donors starled to ques-
tion thé political will and détermination of thé NEPAD architects to honour thé commitment
expressed in thé document. In thé absence of subséquent actions, policy statements were
increasingly seen as mère lip service to noble goals rather than as directives for serious ini-
tiatives. The visible shift in priorities towards material infrastructure projects over policy
issues gave additional reason for questioning thé détermination to implement thé original
political agenda. As a resuit, external financial support for NEPAD failed to match origi-
nal expectations. Senegal's President Wade expressed his frustration at the NEPAD stake-
holder dialogue held on 22-23 October in Johannesburg by stating, "We are spending an
enormous amount of time and money on conférences, but. . . we have not had one single
(project) that bas been realised."
Before thé end of thé year, thé 12th HSGIC summit met in Algiers, the capital of one
of thé five founding member states of the initiative (23 November). The heads of state of
Algeria, Botswana, Republic of Congo, Egypt, Mali, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa and
Sao Tome and Principe attended. To accelerate thé Implementation of NEPAD, thé summit
identified thé following goals: 1) increased development assistance; 2) debt cancellation;
3) increased access to markets of the North without insistence on reciprocity; 4) thé
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pooling of resources provided by partners; 5) effective engagement with the UK
Commission for Africa and in the implementation of the G8 Africa Action Plan; and 6) use
of the 5th anniversary of the MDGs to achieve tangible results. The intégration of NEPAD
into AU structures and processes was mentioned separately in the final communiqué. One
critical issue was the contmued opération of the NEPAD secrétariat out of offices based at
the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) in Midrand (between Pretoria and
Johannesburg). This contributed to réservations that the initiative was being too much
driven and dominated by South Africa. Recommendations that NEPAD move physically
to the AU underlined the continuance of suspicions within the family of African states that
the initiative is being used to promote the particular interests of a minority of states who
wish to pursue their own agendas within a continentally defined framework.
Africa and Globalities
In November, the World Bank issued a gloomy assessment of Africa's economie perfor-
mance in 2004. While the continent reaped the benefit of booming commodity priées, the
effect was more than offset by rising oil priées, from which, however, some African oil-pro-
ducing countries benefited enormously. Although per capita incomes were expected to
increase modestly, the increase was not enough to catch up with other parts of the world.
The growth rate, which in November was estimated by the IMF at 4.5% for sub-Saharan
Africa, would not be sufficient to meet Millennium Development Goals on poverty réduc-
tion, health and éducation. Ineffective economie structures and inefficiënt government
spending were still considered a fundamental problem.
As in other recent years, the world's leading industrial powers in the Group of 8 (G8)
discussed African issues. Six African countries (Algeria, Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal, South
Africa and Uganda) were represented at the summit's African session, held at the US Sea
Island resort in June. The results were widely viewed äs disappointing since, despite Bntish
backing, the industrial countries refused to agrée to a comprehensive write-off of multilat-
eral debt owed by the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC), most of which are in Africa.
So far, only $ 30 bn of a total of $ 100 bn of multilateral debt had been forgiven, with even
the IMF and World Bank admitting that the HIPC scheme had fallen short of expectations.
The G8 agreed to expand funding for the existing HIPC scheme and to extend it untü the
end of 2006. As part of its Africa Outreach plan, the summit also vowed to create a global
HIV/AIDS vaccine initiative, intended to help coordinate scientific research into findmg an
effective treatment for the disease. In the area of conflict, the G8 agreed to launch a multi-
year scheme (untü 2010) to train 50,000 to 75,000 African troops for peacekeeping missions
on the continent. In part, this initiative was intended to coordinate existing training pro-
grammes ofFered by the US, Britain and France. Nevertheless, world leaders did not dis-
cuss such issues as Zimbabwe, while the bloodshed in Darfur merely triggered a call for the
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UN to take the lead in stabilising the situation in Sudan, while the UN, in turn, left the mat-
ter to the African Union.
In contrast, the WTO made a more tangible step forward when one of its trade panels
ruled that American cotton subsidies ($ 3 bn) distort international trade. These subsidies
have been particularly detrimental to cotton producers in some poor West African countries.
While the US appealed the décision, which is expected to be upheld by the WTO, a group
of poor countries led by Rwanda struck a deal with the Americans in Geneva on 31 July to
conduct separate negotiations on cotton subsidies and trade. By the same token, the WTO
pressed the EU to eut its subsidies to sugar farmers further, a programme strongly defended
by poor African, Caribbean and Pacific countries whose sugar exports are bought up by
the EU at more than three times the world price.
United Nations and Peacekeeping
Despite its ineffectual stance on Darfur, UN peacekeeping opérations commenced or con-
tinued in several countries, including Sierra Leone, Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire, Eritrea, Ethiopia,
Burundi and Congo. From April to September, the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAM-
SIL) gradually handed over control of security to the country's police and army. Once the
biggest UN peacekeeping opération in the world, UNAMSIL's size was reduced to some
8,000 men by autumn and was expected to drop to 3,500 by the end of the year. Although
initially projected to be withdrawn from the country by the end of 2004, the Security
Council extended the mission's mandate until July 2005 in view of security worries in
Liberia and Guinea and doubts about the ability of the Sierra Leonean govemment to face
up to potential external threats. The UN's Liberian opération, UNMIL (UN Mission in
Liberia), some 10,000 to 15,000 men strong, was engaged in overseeing a protracted dis-
armament exercise as part of the country's attempts to achieve a return to peaceful politics,
with élections scheduled for 2005. Little if any coordination in security matters occurred
between the UN opérations in Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire, whose security problems fre-
quently spilled across the forested international borders. The UN Mission in Côte d'Ivoire
(UNOCI, 6,240 men), which ran in parallel with thé UN-approved French présence and
integrated former ECOWAS contingents, was approved by the Security Council on 27
February, with deployment beginning in April. The Security Council also imposed an arms
embargo on the country (15 November) as a conséquence of Ivorian government attacks
on French peacekeepers on 4 November. By the end of the year, none of the international
forces had managed to break the deadlock in thé Ivorian conflict. The UN Observation
Mission in Congo (MONUC) continued to expérience serious difficulties. Although thé
Security Council agreed, on 1 October, to expand thé peacekeeping force by over 5,000 men
to a total of 11,000 and beef up its mandate, it was unable to put an end to thé violence by
various militias or thé interférence of neighbouring countries such as Rwanda. A sex-abuse
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scandal ftirther tainted MONUC's standing, already impaired by its inability to protect the
civilian population in the volatile eastern région. By the end of the year, in the wake of the
emerging peace deal between the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and
the Sudanese government, a new UN force was projected to be installed in the south of the
country. A special Security Council meeting in Nairobi on 19 November welcomed the sign-
ing by the Sudanese parties of further arrangements detailing their peace agreement. This
was notwithstanding the UN's ineffectual stance on Darfur, which was partly the respon-
sibility of China and Russia. Both countries have major economie interests in Sudan (arms
experts and importation of Sudanese oil) and consequently opposed sanctions against
Khartoum. The UN Mission to Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) continued to patrol the bor-
der région disputedby the two countries, with little progress towards genuine peace being
achieved. Finally, on 21 May, the Security Council approved the deployment of 5,650 mil-
itary personnel as part of the UN Operation in Burundi (UNOB). This was to take over from
the under-funded AU African Mission in Burundi (AMIB), which consisted of 2,870
troops from Ethiopia, Mozambique and South Africa and was mandated to oversee the
Implementation of ceasefire agreements; support disarmament, démobilisation and the
réintégration of combatants; and ensure favourable conditions for the establishment of
the UN mission.
Peace and Wat-
War continued to affect the lives of many African people. UNHCR provided support for
about 3. l m refugees (4.6 m in the previous year), primarily from Sudan, Burundi, Sudan,
DR Congo, Somalia, Liberia and Angola. Tanzania remained the country with the highest
number of refugees (approx. 690,000) on its sou. In West and Central Africa and in the Horn
there were ongoing violent conflicts. Only the région of Southern Africa was untroubled by
escalations. The complex cross-border conflict situation in the Gréât Lakes région was only
seemingly pacified, withnumerous small-scale violent incidents continuing. Most attention
was attracted by the Darfur conflict. In Côte d'Ivoire, French troops were placed in an
awkward position — as peacekeepers, saviours of French interests and as 'neo-colonial
oppressors'.
The Great Lakes région once again had its share of armed violence: in DR Congo vio-
lence escalated again at the end of May in Bukavu (South Kivu), with fights between gov-
ernment and dissident army troops, the latter obviously supported by Rwanda. Congolese
Tutsi fled the war-torn area across the border to Burundi. Their camp was attacked in August
under mysterieus circumstances and approximately 160 people were murdered. New
fighting was reported in North Kivu in December. Ten thousand civilians fled until a
ceasefire came into effect on 21 December.
One positive development was a basic agreement between the governments of DR
Congo, Rwanda and Uganda during a meeting in Kampala that included the disarmament
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within a year of groups operating from their respective territories against neighbouring
states. Nevertheless, Uganda and Rwanda deployed troops along their common border. A
joint déclaration of eleven heads of states aimed at ending the conflicts in the Great Lakes
région was signed in Dar es Salaam (20 November). In addition, the peace process between
northern and southern Sudan made significant progress. The core of the new relationship
was an agreement on the allocation of benefits from natural resources that was signed in
Naivasha, Kenya on 5 January. This should have meant the end of a conflict that had raged
for at least 21 years. However, in January, new fighting broke out in the Darfur région in
the west and escalated into a new war. In March, the so-called Janjaweed militias extended
their assavtlts and plundered hundreds of villages, murdering their inhabitants. Given the
situation of ongoing killing, US Secretary of State Colin Powell stated on 9 September that
genocide had taken place in Darfur. According to the UN, half of Darfur's six million peo-
ple were directly affected by the conflict. The death toll was variously estimated: while the
lowest reliable number was 70,000, in December Caritas estimated the number of deaths
tobe 180,000.
Contradictory developments were reported from still unpacified Somalia. On the one
hand, there were new local conflicts (the battle at Kistnayo in September and fights
between Somaliland and Puntland over a disputed border line in October). On the other
hand, it was possible to establish a transition government in Kenya (22 August). Tensions
remained high between Ethiopia and Eritrea, without however, any further escalation.
With the govemment's attacks on northern positions on 4 November, the 'frozen' civil
war ui Côte d'Ivoire escalated. At first, the UN peacekeeping force and the related French
mission (4,000 troops) did not adequately counter the attack. On 6 November, the Ivorian
air force bombed the town of Bouaké, the rebel stronghold, and launched an apparently tar-
geted attack on a French military camp there. During the attack, nine French soldiers and
one US citizen died. The African Union and the UN Security Council both discussed sanc-
tions against members of the regime. The violent outbreak precipitated a new wave of
refugees into Liberia, where the ceasefire agreement between government and the two rebel
movements remained shaky.
Democracy and Elections
Eleven national élections (plus one constitutional referendum) were held. They could be
interpreted in different ways - some were steps towards consolidating fragile democracies,
others as évidence of a blockage in the transition process.
Parliamentary élections in South Africa (14 April) led to the consolidation of the ruling
party, combined with decreasing voter participation. Instead of characterising the free mul-
tiparty élection as proof of the further consolidation of democracy ten years after the end-
sing of apartheid, some commentators stressed the périls of the overwhelming dominance
, of one party. Thabo Mbeki was re-elected as president for a second term. One more recent
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phenomenon has been increasing acceptance of constitutional limitations on the number
of consécutive presidential terms (usually two terms). Presidential andparliamentary élec-
tions in Malawi (20 May) ended with a slight shift in power. In Namibia, too, (15-16
November), PresidentNujoma, in office since independence, was not allowedto participate.
Parliamentary and presidential élections in Mozambique (1-2 December) proceeded
along similar lines, though they were heavily criticised by international observers for the
irregularities and intimidation. President Chissano was not allowed to stand a third time as
a candidate. Low expectations accompanied élections in notorious authoritarian Systems:
unfree parliamentary élections in Equatorial Guinea (25 April) were boycotted by the
main opposition parties. An élection of a less exciting nature was also held in Cameroon
(11 October), where only about half the citizens of voting age were enrolled on the lists.
No major changes occurred in the course of parliamentary élections in Botswana (30
October), perceived as one of the oldest democracies on thé continent.
Two other élections were viewed as part of a transition process: Parliamentary élections
were held on thé Comoros (14 and 21 March, 18 and 25 April). The resuit was a 'cohabi-
tation' situation, with président and government from différent political families. As a resuit
of parliamentary élections in Guinea-Bissau (28-30 March), thé former ruling party
made a strong return to the political stage by winning 45 of 100 seats, more than any of its
rivais. The return to civilian government, however, would only be accomplished with thé
presidential élections to be held in March 2005. One positive development was the grad-
uai consolidation of thé crisis-ridden democracy in Niger, following two rounds of parha-
mentary and presidential élections (16 November, 4 December). As favourably viewed were
parliamentary and presidential élections in Ghana (7 December).
Succession crises in authoritarian states in which the rulers had serious health problems
became more apparent. The rules of succession were obviously not clear and had already
led to public discussion in some cases (Guinea, Chad, Togo, Cameroon and potentially
Burkina Faso or Gabon).
Overall, instead of a démocratie breakthrough (such as in Kenya in 2003), there were no
uniform developments in 2004: there were some encouraging trends towards démocratie
consolidation but there was also the consolidation of some authoritarian regimes.
Coup Attempts and thé Struggle AgainstTerrorism
There were several new signs of thé inhérent weakness of several African states in 2004.
Four attempted coups d'état were recorded. A coup attempt in Equatorial Guinea, in which
approx. 80 mercenaries from all over the world (especially South Africa) and thé son of for-
mer British Prime Minister Thatcher were involved, was the most spectacular. The plane
carrying the mercenaries was stopped in Zimbabwe's capital Harare. In Guinea-Bissau, a
mutiny ended with the murder of the joint chief of staff and with the mutineers' demands
being met by the government. In Chad, an attempted military insurrection was reported in
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May, but government was immediately able to bring it under control. In Mauritania, a
putsch attempt in 2003 was followed by two further attempts in 2004 (August and
September). As already noted, the question of succession in several authoritarian states on
the continent became acute. The personalised nature of power meant that the illness of
heads of state in Guinea, Togo, Chad and Cameroon represented a threat to stability, though
in Guinea the matter became less acute when the president's health appeared to stabilise.
Ongoing ethnie conflicts in the Niger Delta, with hundreds of deaths, were a sign of the
weakness of the most populous state on the continent, Nigeria. In addition, numerous states
were unable to administer their whole territories, for example, the north in Uganda, usu-
ally considered to be a strong state.
US African policy was strongly influenced by the terrorist thème. The Pan-Sahel-
Initiative (PSI, later renamed the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Initiative), led by the
US's European Command (EUCOM) in Stuttgart, Germany primarily consisted of train-
ing and instruction for troops from Algeria, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Chad in hunting
down 'terrorists'. Officially, the initiative also targeted smuggling activities and interna-
tional crime. The général staffs of these countries and their counterparts from Morocco,
Senegal and Tunisia participated in a EUCOM conference in Stuttgart on the Worldwide
'fight against terrorism' (23-24 February). In March, 43 fighters from the Algerian (and
supposedly al-Qaida-supported) 'Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat'
(GSPC) were killed. At the end of March, GSPC leader Amari Saif ('el para') was captured
by a Chadian rebel group and handed over to Algeria (June). Amari Saif was responsible
for the kidnapping of European tourists in 2003. In addition, US General Charles Wald vis-
ited 11 African countries (Morocco, Algeria, Nigeria, Angola, South Africa, Namibia,
Gabon, Sao Tomé and Principe, Ghana, Niger and Tunisia). A parallel initiative was run in
the Horn of Africa. It led to the capture of several dozen persons in Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan,
Kenya and Djibouti (April). But there were also genuine African initiatives. At a high AU-
government level a second meeting was held in Algiers (13-14 October) dealing with the
prevention and fight against terrorism in Africa. The terror discourse was still being
exploited by several African governments to denounce legitimate opposition movements
and parties.
HIV/AIDS and other Epidémies and Disasters
Sub-Saharan Africa hasjust over 10% of the world's population, but it is home to more than
60% of all people living with HIV. According to an AIDS epidemie update for 2004
released by the United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), the number of HIV-
infected people up to thé âge of 49 years was estimated at over 25 million, the majority of
these being women between the âges of 15 and 49 (over 13 m). It was further estimated that
during 2004 more than 3 million further adults and children were newly affected with HIV,
and that during the year close to 2.5 million adults and children died from AIDS.
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While the average HIV prevalence in sub-Saharan Africa among adults was estimated
by UNAIDS at 7.4% in 2004, all the most affected countries are in Southern Africa, which
has a considerably higher rate (see further details in the regional chapter). AIDS is consid-
ered to be the leading cause of death on the continent (ahead of even malaria). The
Commission on HIV/AIDS and Governance in Africa (CHGA) was established as a UN
system-wide initiative in February 2003. During the year, it held two meetings, in Maputo
(23-25 March) and in Addis Ababa (13-14 October). It organised an interactive conference
in Botswana on treatment scale-up and the prevention of mother to child transmission
(26-27 July); another in Ethiopia on HIV/AIDS and its impact on rural livelihoods and food
security (12 October); a third in Ghana entitled 'The World of Work, Legal Frameworks'
(18-19 November); and a fourth in Cameroon on gender and HIV/AIDS orphans in Africa
(13-14 December).
Successes in combating the pandémie to date have been rare, the most prominent being
in Uganda, where the earlier escalation in infection rates has been halted and the trend
reversed. During the year, the World Bank published an interim review of the Multi-
Country HIV/AIDS Program (MAP) for Africa. It identified a number of shortcomings in
practice. lts recommendations include making national HIV/AIDS frameworks more
strategie; strengthening HIV/AIDS governance and civil society involvement; improving
public sector responses; expediting the completion of national monitoring and évaluation
systems; further harmonising and simplifying procedures; and enhancing performance
incentives.
Treatment access remained low: the WHO estimated mat during 2003 (latest available
figure) only 3% of the 4.4 million people in need received antiretroviral therapy. The World
Bank agreed to allocate $ 60 m through a new treatment accélération programme to scale
up treatment, with Burkina Faso, Ghana and Mozambique as pilot countries, Botswana and
Senegal have made their own substantial progress in increasing access to treatment. The
AIDS pandémie remained far from being solved and continued to pose the biggest single
threat to the welfare of the population, in particular in Southern African societies. On the
occasion of World AIDS Day (l December), a former chief writer for UNAIDS from South
Africa commented upon the dilemma that "part of the problem also lies in the failure to rec-
onciïe the schizoid aspects of AIDS - as a short-term emergency and a long-term crisis."
Southeast Asia, with its tsunami at year's end, found itself, in top position in the rank-
ing of Worldwide catastrophes, a place normally reserved for Africa. In comparison to the
death toll in Asia, the destruction in Africa caused by the tsunami seemed negligible. This
was the reason international media attention on this aspect of the disaster was so limited.
However, Somalia was badly affected, with approximately 300 people dying along a
650-küometre strip of coast. About 18,000 households were seriously damaged or
destroyed. In Tanzania, ten people died, in Kenya one person. On the Seychelles, there was
considérable loss of property, and water reservoirs, especially drinking-water reservoirs,
were contaminated.
Sub-Saharan Afnca • 13
The plague of locusts in the western Sahel affected many more people, and approxi-
mately 3.5 m ha of agricultural land were at risk. This was the worst plague of locusts in
15 years. FAO anticipated damage amounting to $ 245 m for 2004 alone. Worst affected
were Mauritania, Mali and Senegal. Niger, too, was badly hit, with food shortages expected
in the coming year. Technical support mainly came frorn the North Afhcan countries,
specifically Morocco, Algeria and Libya.
Cross-regional Forms of Coopération
On 26-27 November, the tenth Francophone summit was held in the Burkinabé capital
Ouagadougou, bringing together 15 heads of state and six prime ministers. The summit dis-
cuss,ed a range of African and international issues, including, officially andunofficially, the
Ivorian crisis, and demanded strict application of the Linas-Marcoussis and Accra III agree-
ments (see the West Africa regional chapter). The 'Autorité du Basin du Niger' (ABN), a
grouping of nine West and Central African states, held a conference in Paris (26—27 April)
to discuss coopération in the sharing of river resources and the protection of ecosystems,
but with few tangible results. CEN-SAD, dominated by Libya, held its sixth conference of
leaders and heads of state in Bamako on 15 May. Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau and Liberia
were accepted as new members, thereby increasing the number of member states to 21.
Ghana participated as an observer.
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